internationally." 2 The editor, Adolphe Jérôme Blanqui (1798-1854), who had succeeded Jean-Baptiste Say as the holder of the political economy chair at the Conservatoire des arts et métiers, included notes and comments by all the principal economists in Europe: Say, Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo, Buchanan, Sismondi, and von Storch, among others. As a result, The Wealth of Nations "was no longer an English effort, no longer an English and French work, no more just the labor of two people, but rather a work of many hands from throughout Europe, all people working to develop a body of knowledge" (Carpenter 2002, lxii) . In the fi rst half of the nineteenth century French was still the language of choice for intellectual exchange, and many economists were more comfortable reading Smith in French rather than in the original English. As Keith Tribe (2003, 162) explains, Smithʼs ideas "generally became known through the work of translators and commentators," the most important one being JeanBaptiste Say, who "wrote in a language that educated Europeans could read and wrote in a style that was considered more accessible than that of Smith." Therefore, the dissemination of Smithʼs ideas occurred in no small part through Sayʼs commentary and interpretation of the Garnier translation.
3 Two examples of those educated Europeans who read Smith in Garnierʼs French were Storch and Marx. Heinrich von Storch, the German-Russian economist who composed his Cours dʼéconomie politique for the sons of the Emperor of Russia in 1815, lifted large segments of his text from Garnierʼs translation and from Sayʼs Traité dʼéconomie politique. 4 (After Storch accused Say of plagiarism, Say [1825] published a terse note in the Revue encyclopédique to set the record straight.) Karl Marx became acquainted with political economy in 1843-44 through extensive readings of Sayʼs Traité and Garnierʼs translation of The Wealth of Nations.
5

Garnierʼs Choice of Words
Given the importance of the Garnier translation, one may suspect that Garnierʼs understanding of Smith played a tacit but signifi cant role in the 320 History of Political Economy 38: 2 (2006) 3. Say himself became acquainted with Smithʼs work in the original English in the 1790s. 4. See for instance volume 1, pages 72-73, of Storch 1815, where Smithʼs famous passage on the baker and the butcher appears (without acknowledgment) in Garnierʼs translation.
5. His readings also included Ricardo, Mill, and McCulloch, all in French. See Marx 1982 . Also see Marxʼs excerpts from the Garnier translation of Smith (with commentary and partial translation into German) in Marx 1981 . Marx used the original 1802 edition. development of economic science in Continental Europe. 6 This will seem especially relevant if we recall that several translations of The Wealth of Nations had been published before, and that these translations differ from Garnierʼs in some important respects. In this article, I will focus on the translation of one word: self-love. This word appears only twice in the book, but both occurrences are in the same strategic place: the oft-quoted passage in the second chapter of book 1, where Smith ([1776] 1976, I.ii.2) discusses the causes of the division of labor (occurrences of selflove in bold):
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offi ces which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevo lence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Here is how Garnier (1802) translates the passage. Translations of selflove are in bold, and the italics are Garnierʼs:
Mais lʼhomme a presque continuellement besoin du secours de ses semblables, et cʼest en vain quʼil lʼattendrait de leur seule bienveillance. Il sera bien plus sûr de son fait en sʼadressant à leur intérêt personnel, et en leur persuadant quʼil y va de leur propre avantage de faire ce quʼil souhaite dʼeux. Cʼest ce que fait celui qui propose à un autre un marché quelconque; le sens de sa proposition est ceci: Donnez-moi ce dont jʼai besoin, et vous aurez de moi ce dont vous avez besoin vous-même;
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6. Garnierʼs understanding of Smith was not only infl uential through the French translation. The 1805 Glasgow edition of The Wealth of Nations (printed for J. & J. Scrymgeour at the University Press) included an English version of Garnierʼs commentary on Smith. This edition was reprinted many times. According to Keith Tribe, "It can be said with some justifi cation that during the fi rst half of the nineteenth century the most consistently accessible guide to Wealth of Nations in English was that of Germain Garnier" (Tribe and Mizuta 2002, 37) . et la très-majeure partie de ces bons offi ces qui nous sont si nécessaires, sʼobtiennent de cette façon. Ce nʼest pas de la bienveillance du boucher, du marchand de bière ou du boulanger, que nous attendons notre dîner, mais bien du soin quʼils apportent à leurs intérêts. Nous ne nous adressons pas à leur humanité, mais à leur égoïsme; et ce nʼest jamais de nos besoins que nous leur parlons, cʼest toujours de leur avantage.
Smith uses self-love twice, but Garnier chooses to translate each occurrence differently: intérêt personnel and égoïsme. This choice of words may not seem particularly problematic to the modern French reader, who is used to reading Smith in Garnierʼs translation. However, Garnierʼs choice was a deliberate departure from previous practice. In all French translations published before Garnier, self-love was translated as amour-propre. The anonymous translation of 1778 reads: "sʼil peut intéresser leur amourpropre en sa faveur" and "nous ne nous adressons pas à leur humanité, mais à leur amour-propre" 7 In Blavetʼs 1779 translation, the same passages are rendered as "en intéressant leur amour-propre en sa faveur" and "ce nʼest point à leur humanité, mais à leur amour-propre que nous nous adressons." 8 A small variation can be observed in Roucher (1790): "sʼil peut intéresser leur amour propre en sa faveur" and "nous nous adressons, non pas à leur humanité, mais à leur amour pour eux-mêmes" Only the unpublished translation by Abbé Morellet deviates from the norm. The fi rst occurrence reads: "lorsquʼil peut les disposer à ce quʼil désire par la vüe de leur propre intérêt." Interestingly, Morellet skips the second occurrence of self-love. He translates: "Nous ne nous adressons pas à leur humanité et nous ne leur parlons pas de nos besoins, mais de leur avantage." 9 Garnierʼs decision to use intérêt personnel instead of amour-propre was perceived as signifi cant at the time. In his review of the Garnier translation, Martial Desrenaudes (1802) gave a list of what he said were errors in the latest edition of Blavetʼs translation (1800), accompanied by the cor- Hume ([1751] 1983, 90) once called the "selfi sh hypothesis" in order to refute it: "How selfi sh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others" (Smith [1759] 1976, I.i.1). In the system that Smith develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, human behavior is derived not from one, but two principles: self-love and sympathy. As I argued in my recent book, Self-Interest before Adam Smith (2003) , Smithʼs response to Mandeville in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is very close to the one Rousseau put forward a few years before in the Second Discourse, especially with regard to fi rst principles. Both authors respond to Mandevilleʼs exposition of the selfi sh hypothesis by singling out pity, a subsidiary element in Mandevilleʼs narrative, and elevating it to the status of a fi rst principle. As fi rst principles, self-love and sympathy in Smith correspond to amour de soi and pitié in Rousseau (Force 2003, chap. 1) . In France, aside from Rousseauʼs work, the notion that self-love is the cause of all or most human actions was rarely challenged. The focus was on refuting the idea that self-love is a vice. For instance, in the "Amour-propre" article of the Dictionnaire philosophique, Voltaire ([1764] 1954) presents the selfi sh hypothesis as universally acknowledged and self-evident:
Ceux qui ont dit que lʼamour de nous-mêmes est la base de tous nos sentiments et de toutes nos actions ont donc eu grande raison dans lʼInde, en Espagne, et dans toute la terre habitable: et comme on nʼécrit point pour prouver aux hommes quʼils ont un visage, il nʼest pas besoin de leur prouver quʼils ont de lʼamour-propre. Cet amour-propre est lʼinstrument de notre conservation; il ressemble à lʼinstrument de la perpétuité de lʼespèce : il nous est nécessaire, il nous est cher, il nous fait plaisir, et il faut le cacher.
Virtues, for having written that virtues cannot be genuine because they are based on "amour-propre": Quand le duc de La Rochefoucauld eut écrit ses pensées sur lʼamour-propre, et quʼil eut mis à découvert ce ressort de lʼhomme, un monsieur Esprit, de lʼOratoire, écrivit un livre captieux, intitulé: De la Fausseté des vertus humaines. Cet Esprit dit quʼil nʼy a point de vertu; mais par grâce il termine chaque chapitre en renvoyant à la charité chrétienne. Ainsi, selon le sieur Esprit, ni Caton, ni Aristide, ni Marc-Aurèle, ni Épic-tète nʼétaient des gens de bien; mais on nʼen peut trouver que chez les chrétiens. Parmi les chrétiens, il nʼy a de vertu que chez les catholiques; parmi les catholiques, il fallait encore en excepter les jésuites, ennemis des oratoriens; partant, la vertu ne se trouvait guère que chez les ennemis des jésuites. . . . Une telle insolence révolte. Je nʼen dirai pas davantage, car je me mettrais en colère.
13
Jacques Espritʼs book was a theological exposé that turned the Augustinian assumptions of La Rochefoucauldʼs Maximes into a systematic and explicit doctrine based on original sin and the fall of man. Because the Augustinian theology of the Maximes remained implicit, Voltaire and the philosophes could very well perform a secular reading of La Rochefoucauld and endorse his illustration of the selfi sh hypothesis while denying that self-love was a vice. No such reading was possible with Esprit, who became a polemical target.
Another Port-Royal author who met the same fate was Nicole. In the "Intérêt" article of the Encyclopédie, Saint-Lambert (1751-72) vilifi ed him for writing that "amour-propre" could not be the source of virtues:
Lʼamitié sera toujours une vertu, quoiquʼelle ne soit fondée que sur le besoin quʼune âme a dʼune autre âme.
La passion de lʼordre, de la justice, sera la première vertu, le véritable héroïsme, quoiquʼelle ait sa source dans lʼamour de nous-mêmes.
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13. "After the duke of La Rochefoucauld wrote his thoughts on self-love and uncovered this motive of human action, a certain Monsieur Esprit, of the Oratory, wrote a specious book titled On the Falsity of Human Virtues. This Esprit says there is no such thing as virtue, but he does us the favor of ending each chapter by mentioning Christian charity. Thus according to Monsieur Esprit, neither Cato, nor Aristides, nor Marcus Aurelius, nor Epictetus, were good people; such people can only be found among Christians. Among Christians, only Catholics have virtue; among Catholics, Jesuits (enemies of the Oratorians) must be excluded; so much so that virtue can only be found among the Jesuitsʼ enemies. . . . Such arrogance is revolting. I will not say more, because it would make me lose my temper. " Voltaire [1764] 1954, art. "Fausseté des vertus humaines." Voilà des vérités qui ne devraient être que triviales et jamais contestées; mais une classe dʼhommes du dernier siècle a voulu faire de lʼamour-propre un principe toujours vicieux; cʼest en partant dʼaprès cette idée que Nicole a fait vingt volumes de morale, qui ne sont quʼun assemblage de sophismes méthodiquement arrangés et lourdement écrits.
Pascal même, le grand Pascal, a voulu regarder en nous comme une imperfection ce sentiment de lʼamour de nous-mêmes que Dieu nous a donné. . . . M. de la Rochefoucauld qui sʼexprimait avec précision et avec grâce, a écrit presque dans le même esprit que Pascal et Nicole; . . . Ce livre de M. de la Rochefoucauld, celui de Pascal, qui étaient entre les mains de tout le monde, ont insensiblement accoutumé le public français à prendre toujours le mot dʼamour-propre en mauvaise part; et il nʼy a pas longtemps quʼun petit nombre dʼhommes commence à nʼy plus attacher nécessairement les idées de vice, dʼorgueil, etc. 14 This passage is particularly interesting for our purposes because it spells out the connotations of the word amour-propre in the middle of the eighteenth century. The word is still associated with the Augustinian critique of virtues, which had become almost a matter of conventional wisdom with the success of Pascalʼs Pensées, La Rochefoucauldʼs Maximes, and Nicoleʼs Essais de morale. At the same time, Saint-Lambert presents the encyclopédistes as a small group of enlightened men whose critique of the critique of virtues was only beginning to change the connotations associated with the word amour-propre.
A common practice among eighteenth-century philosophers consisted in presenting philosophical disputes as semantic ones. Near the beginning of De lʼesprit, in a chapter titled "On the Abuse of Words," Helvétius 326 History of Political Economy 38:2 (2006) 14. "Friendship will always be a virtue, even though it is based on the need a soul has for another soul.
Love of order, justice, will always be the prime virtue and the true heroism, even though it has its source in the love of oneself.
These truths should be commonplace and never questioned, but a certain group of people in the last century meant to turn self-love into an ever-maligned principle.
This was the basis on which Nicole made twenty volumes of morals, which are but a collection of methodically arranged and gracelessly written sophisms.
Pascal himself, the great Pascal, meant to view as an imperfection this love of ourselves that God gave us. . . . M. de La Rochefoucauld, who expressed himself with precision and grace, wrote nearly in the same spirit as Pascal and Nicole. . . . La Rochefoucauldʼs book, and Pascalʼs, which were in everybodyʼs hands, have gradually accustomed the French public to take the word self-love always in a bad sense. It is only recently that a small number of men have begun to dissociate it from the ideas of vice, pride, etc." (1758, I, IV) discusses the meaning of amour-propre in La Rochefoucauld. He claims that readers have misunderstood the word by asso ciating it with vices like pride and vanity:
Lorsque le célebre M De La Rochefoucault dit que lʼamour-propre est le principe de toutes nos actions, combien lʼignorance de la vraie signifi cation de ce mot amour-propre ne souleva-t-elle pas de gens contre cet illustre auteur? On prit lʼamour-propre pour orgueil et vanité; et lʼon sʼimagina, en conséquence, que M De La Rochefoucault plaçoit dans le vice la source de toutes les vertus. Il étoit cependant facile dʼapper-cevoir que lʼamour-propre, ou lʼamour de soi, nʼétoit autre chose quʼun sentiment gravé en nous par la nature; que ce sentiment se transformoit dans chaque homme en vice ou en vertu, selon les goûts et les passions qui lʼanimoient; et que lʼamour-propre, différemment modifi é, produisoit également lʼorgueil et la modestie.
15
While he claims La Rochefoucauld as a predecessor, Helvétius, presumably because of the moral and religious connotations still attached to the word, never uses amour-propre in his own doctrine. Instead, he uses inté-rêt personnel (self-interest):
Quel homme, en effet, sʼil sacrifi e lʼorgueil de se dire plus vertueux que les autres à lʼorgueil dʼêtre plus vrai, et sʼil sonde, avec une attention scrupu leuse, tous les replis de son ame, ne sʼappercevra pas que cʼest uniquement à la maniere différente dont lʼintérêt personnel se modifi e, que lʼon doit ses vices et ses vertus? Que tous les hommes sont mus par la même force? 16 Helvétius agrees with his fellow encyclopédistes that the word amourpropre should be free from the moral and religious connotations that are Force / First Principles in Translation 327
15. "When the famous M. de La Rochefoucauld said that self-love is the principle of all our actions, how many people, ignorant as they were of the true meaning of the word selflove, did not rise against this illustrious author? They took self-love to mean pride and vanity; consequently, they imagined that M. de La Rochefoucauld held vice to be the source of all virtues. Yet it was easy to see that self-love, or the love of oneself, is nothing but a feeling that nature has engraved in us; that such feeling is transformed into a vice or a virtue within each man according to the tastes and the passions that animate him; that self-love, differently modifi ed, can result in pride as well as in modesty."
16. "What man, if he gives up the pride of claiming a superior virtue for the pride of being more truthful, if he scrupulously looks into the recesses of his soul, will not realize that virtues and vices arise exclusively from the various ways in which self-interest is modifi ed? That all men are driven by the same power?" (Helvétius 1758, I, II, III). traditionally associated with it. Yet, after arguing about the meaning of amour-propre, he takes the additional step of dispensing with the word altogether, and using a word with much less baggage: intérêt personnel, which was not widely used until the 1740s and was free of the negative overtones of amour-propre. 17 The word is perfectly suited to designate the fi rst principle in Helvétiusʼs doctrine: a natural impulse that is universal, morally neutral, and the cause of all human actions.
If intérêt personnel was new and relatively free of connotations in 1758, at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was very much associated with the doctrine of Helvétius and neo-Epicureanism in general. A good witness to this fact is Mme de Staël (1807). On the one hand, she complains, in a very general way, that the nineteenth century seems to be the century of intérêt personnel: "Nous vivons dans un siècle où lʼin-térêt personnel semble le seul principe de toutes les actions des hommes."
18 On the other hand, she assigns a clear genealogy to this way of thinking. Staël ([1810] 1958-60, 284 ) distinguishes between a French philosophical school (Helvétius, Diderot, Saint-Lambert) whose ethics was based on the principle of intérêt personnel, and an English school (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith) that rejected the selfi sh hypothesis:
De la morale fondée sur lʼintérêt personnel. Les écrivains français ont eu tout-à-fait raison de considérer la morale fondée sur lʼintérêt comme une conséquence de la métaphysi-que qui attribuoit toutes les idées aux sensations. Sʼil nʼy a rien dans lʼâme que ce que les sensations y ont mis, lʼagréable ou le désagréable doit être lʼunique mobile de notre volonté. Helvétius, Diderot, SaintLambert nʼont pas dévié de cette ligne, et ils ont expliqué toutes les actions, y compris le dévouement des martyrs, par lʼamour de soimême. Les anglais, qui, pour la plupart, professent en métaphysique la philosophie expérimentale, nʼont jamais pu supporter cependant la morale fondée sur lʼintérêt. Shaftsbury [sic], Hutcheson, Smith, etc., ont proclamé le sens moral, et la sympathie, comme la source de toutes les vertus. Hume lui-même, le plus sceptique des philosophes anglais, 328 History of Political Economy 38:2 (2006) 17. According to the ARTFL database, the earliest occurrence of intérêt personnel is in Cardinal de Retzʼs Mémoires (1717).
18. "We live in a century in which self-interest seems to be the only principle of human actions." nʼa pu lire sans dégoût cette théorie de lʼamour de soi, qui fl étrit la beauté de lʼâme.
19
As to the word égoïsme, it is fairly new when Garnier uses it in 1802. Like intérêt personnel, it is not common until the middle of the eighteenth century, 20 and both words are often used as synonyms.
21
When Roucher, Blavet, and the anonymous translator of 1778 use amourpropre to translate self-love, their choice is consistent with a philosophical tradition going back to the seventeenth century, a tradition in which En glish and French authors continuously respond to each other. In this dialogue, amour-propre means self-love and self-love means amour-propre. At the same time, because amour-propre and self-love are so widely used, and especially used in polemical contexts, their very defi nition is at stake in the constant battle between advocates and adversaries of the selfi sh hypothesis. Consequently, in the 1780s and 1790s, someone seeing amour-propre twice in the same paragraph of the French translation of The Wealth of Nations would, at least in some way, also remember the complicated history of the word: its longstanding association with the critique of virtues, the efforts by the philosophes to dissociate it from the critique of virtues, and Rousseauʼs claim that self-love is not the cause of all human actions. These connotations are roughly equivalent to the connotations of selflove in 1776: its early association with Mandevilleʼs paradox, and the refutation of this paradox by Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith himself.
On the other hand, the words Garnier uses in 1802, intérêt personnel and égoïsme, are more univocal. They have a shorter history behind them, and they are associated with a neo-Epicurean approach that tends to explain all human behavior on the basis of a single principle: Helvétius often calls
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19. "On ethical systems based on self-interest. French writers have been quite right to see the ethical system based on self-interest as a consequence of the metaphysical doctrine that derived all ideas from sensations. If there is nothing in the soul but that which sensations have put in it, pleasure and pain must be the only motives underlying our will. Helvétius, Diderot, Saint-Lambert never deviated from this line, and they explained all actions, including the sacrifi ce of martyrs, by referring to the love of oneself. As to the English, even though most of them adhere to experimental philosophy when it comes to metaphysics, they have never tolerated these ethical systems based on selfinterest. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Smith, etc., have held that moral sense and sympathy are the source of all virtues. Even Hume, the most skeptical of English philosophers, could not read without disgust this theory of the love of oneself, which tarnished the soulʼs beauty." 20. According to the ARTFL database, the earliest occurrence of égoïsme is in 1757. 21. For instance: "Voilà où vous conduit le detestable intérêt personnel, lʼégoïsme réduit en action" (Abbé Barruel [1781 Barruel [ ] 1830 it intérêt personnel (self-interest) but also simply intérêt (interest), and sometimes plaisir (pleasure).
Intérêt Personnel as a First Principle
At the same time, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the complex connotations of amour-propre are beginning to fade away, and the word is gradually restricted to the narrower meaning it has in modern French: personal vanity. This evolution appears very clearly in the successive editions of Jean-Baptiste Sayʼs Traité dʼéconomie politique. In the "Discours préliminaire" of the original edition (1803), Say distinguishes between vanité personnelle and intérêt personnel as motives that may cloud someoneʼs judgments on economic issues:
De ce que lʼEconomie politique est lʼaffaire de tout le monde, naît un autre genre de diffi culté: cʼest quʼon a pour juges, non seulement ceux qui se sont occupés des ces matières, mais encore ceux qui nʼy entendent rien. Comme chacun a donné quelques soins aux valeurs dont sa fortune est composée, chacun se croit en droit dʼavoir une opinion sur les valeurs, une opinion qui se trouve exaltée par la vanité personnelle, comme toutes les opinions, et de plus par lʼintérêt personnel, qui, à notre insu, exerce tant dʼempire sur nos jugements. (1:xl) 22 In the second edition (1814) Say proposes a variation on the same thought, but the keywords are almost the same:
Les opinions en économie politique ont même ce malheur particulier, cʼest quʼelles ne se trouvent pas seulement soutenues par la vanité, la plus universelle des infi rmités humaines, mais par lʼintérêt personnel qui ne lʼest guère moins, et qui, à notre insu, et malgré nous, exerce tant dʼempire sur notre façon de penser. (1:lxviij) 23 330 History of Political Economy 38:2 (2006) 22. "The fact that political economy is everybodyʼs business causes another kind of difficulty: one is judged not only by those who have studied these matters, but also by those who misunderstand them entirely. Since everybody has given some thought to the investments that make up his own wealth, everybody thinks he is entitled to an opinion on investments, an opinion that happens to be exalted by personal vanity [vanité personnelle] , as all opinions are, and also by self-interest [intérêt personnel], which infl uences our judgments so greatly, and in ways we do not realize."
23. "Opinions in political economy have the distinct misfortune of being sustained not only by vanity [vanité] (the most universal of human weaknesses) but also by self-interest [intérêt personnel], which isnʼt much less universal, and infl uences our manner of thinking so greatly, and in ways we cannot help and do not realize."
In the fi fth edition (1826), however, a major change occurs:
Lorsquʼune fois un auteur a manifesté une opinion, la vanité, la plus universelle des infi rmités humaines, veut quʼil la soutienne. Lʼintérêt personnel se joint quelquefois à lʼamour-propre; et lʼon sait quelle infl uence il exerce, même à notre insu, sur nos opinions. De là les doctrines hasardées quʼon voit naître chaque jour et les objections quʼon reproduit après quʼelles ont été cent fois réfutées. (1:xc) 24 In 1826, the meaning of amour-propre has diverged so much from the meaning of intérêt personnel that Say does not hesitate to use both words in the same paragraph in order to designate psychological motives that work together but are entirely distinct. In fact, it can be shown that the modern meaning of amour-propre was present in Sayʼs thinking as early as 1817. In the fi rst edition of his small volume on morals and customs, Say (1817, 83) made a clear distinction between amour-propre and intérêt, and he equated amour-propre with vanity:
Les philosophes moralistes paraissent croire que lʼamour de soi, lʼin-térêt, dirige les actions des hommes plus que ne le fait lʼamour-propre, la vanité. Je pense au contraire que la vanité exerce sur eux plus dʼem-pire, généralement parlant, que lʼamour de soi. Il suffi t dʼobserver dans combien de cas les hommes agissent par vanité dʼune manière opposée à leurs intérêts, depuis lʼenfant qui blessé dʼune mortifi cation quʼon lui a fait essuyer, boude contre son ventre, jusquʼau potentat à qui lʼon fait faire tant de sottise en le fl attant, et qui détruit son pays, cʼest-à-dire le fondement de sa puissance pour se venger dʼune insulte de gazette.
In this passage, amour-propre is explicitly presented as a synonym for vanité. Another remarkable example of the same use of amour-propre can be found in Sayʼs (1825, 578) reply to Storchʼs accusation of plagiarism:
Dans ces notes, je crois ne mʼêtre écarté en rien des égards que se doivent deux écrivains qui, avec des intentions droites, cultivent la même science. Lʼamour-propre un peu trop susceptible de M. Storch nʼen a pas jugé ainsi. 26 In these two examples as in the 1826 version of the Traité dʼéconomie politique, amour-propre (self-importance) has to do with self-image, selfdelusion, and irrational behavior, and its connotation is entirely negative. Intérêt personnel (self-interest) is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it is the impulse that causes us to prefer ourselves to others and makes us biased in the evaluation of the opinions we profess; on the other hand, it is the drive behind economic activity, the motive that prompts human beings to save and invest. When Say elaborates on the parts of The Wealth of Nations that discuss the role of private interests in the optimal allocation of capital, he uses the word intérêt personnel:
Il est heureux que lʼintérêt personnel veille sans cesse à la conservation des capitaux des particuliers, et quʼon ne puisse en aucun temps distraire un capital dʼun emploi productif, sans se priver dʼun revenu proportionné.
Smith pense quʼen tout pays, la profusion ou lʼimpéritie de certains particuliers, et des administrateurs de la fortune publique, est plus que compensée par la frugalité de la majorité des citoyens, et par le soin quʼils prennent de leurs intérêts. (1841, 116) 27 Similarly, in a passage that develops Smithʼs view on the freedom of trade, Say argues that the criterion for deciding whether a particular good should be purchased locally or imported is intérêt personnel:
332 History of Political Economy 38:2 (2006) 26. "In these notes, I think I have never failed to show the respect that two well-meaning writers who cultivate the same science owe one another. Mr. Storchʼs over-sensitive vanity disagrees."
27. "It is fortunate that self-interest [intérêt personnel] should constantly take care of the preservation of private capital, and that it should be impossible to divert some capital from a productive use without forfeiting the corresponding income.
Smith believes that in every country, the profl igacy and incompetence of some individuals and of the administrators of the publicʼs wealth is more than offset by the frugality of the majority of the citizens and by the care with which they attend to their own interests [leurs intérêts] ." Le sacrifi ce au prix duquel nous obtenons des étrangers cette matière première, nʼa rien de plus fâcheux que le sacrifi ce des avances et des consommations que nous fesons en chaque genre de production pour obtenir un nouveau produit. Lʼintérêt personnel est toujours le meilleur juge de lʼétendue de ce sacrifi ce et de lʼétendue du dédommagement quʼon peut sʼen promettre; et quoique lʼintérêt personnel se trompe quelquefois, cʼest, au demeurant, le juge le moins dangereux, et celui dont les jugemens coûtent le moins. (1841, 156) 
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The importance of the concept of intérêt personnel for French readers of Smith at the beginning of the nineteenth century is underscored by the presence of an index entry titled "INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel" in the Garnier translation in 1802. The entry refers to four passages in The Wealth of Nations where Smith discusses the relationship between private interests and the public interest, and the role of private interests in the optimal allocation of capital:
INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel. Dans lʼétat de liberté, dirige lʼindustrie vers la route la plus profi table à toute la société. III, 58. Et tout capital vers lʼemploi le plus conforme à lʼintérêt général. Id, 435. Est un guide plus sûr, à cet égard, que tout homme dʼEtat ou législateur quelconque. Id., 60. Ce concours entre lʼintérêt privé et lʼintérêt public est dérangé par les réglemens du système commercial, et comment. Id., 436. 29 Remarkably, in the index that appears for the fi rst time in the third edition of The Wealth of Nations (1784), 30 there is no such entry. Self-interest or private interest are nowhere mentioned as keywords. 31 On the other hand, this index has an entry for self-love, defi ned as "the governing principle Force / First Principles in Translation 333
28. "The sacrifi ce involved in obtaining this commodity from abroad is not more painful than the sacrifi ce involved in the investment and consumption necessary to obtain a new product. Self-interest [intérêt personnel] is always the best judge to determine how large the sacrifi ce is and how large the corresponding reward must be; even though self-interest [inté-rêt personnel] in the intercourse of human society" (Haakonssen and Skinner 2001, 203) . The reference is of course to the only passage where the word appears, the second chapter of book 1, which discusses the causes of the division of labor.
Why is self-love a keyword, while there is no entry for words like interest, private interest, or self-interest? It is because the word self-love is used in the only passage in The Wealth of Nations where Smith discusses (or at least comes close to discussing) fi rst principles. 32 As we have seen before, self-love is a widely used concept that is almost always used as a fi rst principle in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. On the other hand, if we check the passages where Garnier uses avantage personnel or inté-rêt personnel against the original English, we will fi nd that Smith uses expressions like his own advantage or his own interest. The passage that the Garnier index summarizes as "INTÉRÊT privé ou personnel. Dans lʼétat de liberté, dirige lʼindustrie vers la route la plus profi table à toute la société" is the very famous passage where the invisible hand appears. Here is how it reads in Garnier:
En cela, comme dans beaucoup dʼautres cas, il est conduit par une main invisible, pour remplir une fi n qui nʼentre nullement dans ses intentions; et ce nʼest pas toujours ce quʼil y a de plus mal pour la société, que cette fi n nʼentre pour rien dans ses intentions. Tout en ne cherchant que son intérêt personnel, il travaille souvent dʼune manière bien plus efficace pour lʼintérêt de la société, que sʼil avait réellement pour but dʼy travailler.
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In the original English, the expression that corresponds to "tout en ne cherchant que son intérêt personnel" is "by pursuing his own interest." In French, intérêt personnel sounds very much like a basic concept, a fi rst principle that deserves its own entry in the index. This is confi rmed by the fact that Jean-Baptiste Say, the leading interpreter of Smith at the time, uses intérêt personnel whenever he elaborates on the passages from book 4 of The Wealth of Nations that are mentioned in Gar nierʼs index entry. In the original English, however, it is much more diffi cult to read an expression like his own interest as a basic concept, especially since there is no entry for words like personal interest or self-interest in the index. Only the passage from book 1 where the word self-love appears can be construed as referring to fi rst principles. This is where Garnierʼs choice of intérêt personnel instead of amourpropre has the weightiest consequences. In all previous translations, amourpropre appeared only at the beginning of the book, just as self-love does in the original. In the Garnier translation, intérêt personnel appears not only at the beginning (to translate self-love), but also in book 4 (to translate his own interest). Thanks to the use of an identical word, a conceptual connection is established between the principle underlying the division of labor (in book 1), and the principle underlying saving and investment (in book 4). This connection is established not only with the specifi c passage in book 4 where Garnier uses intérêt personnel, but also in the many passages in book 4 where Garnier uses intérêt and intérêts privés to translate Smithʼs analysis of the relationship between private interests and the public interest. Whereas Smith uses a variety of words and concepts, Garnier uses just one: intérêt personnel. Translate intérêt personnel back into English: instead of the variety of words Smith uses, you will have only one word, self-interest. In Garnierʼs translation, Smithʼs system seems to be entirely derived from the axiom of self-interest. This axiomatic coherence (which is far from obvious in Smithʼs original text) is of course characteristic of the orthodox school that developed in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. What is remarkable is that many years before there was an orthodox school, its assumptions regarding self-interest were already present in Garnierʼs translation.
It would of course be an exaggeration to claim that Garnierʼs translation is the prime motivating factor behind the conventional reading of The Wealth of Nations: self-interest is the fi rst principle of Smithʼs doctrine and of economic science in general.
34 I would simply submit that Gar nierʼs choice of words and Sayʼs enthusiastic endorsement of this choice are an early manifestation of what would later cohere into the modern, conventional reading of Smith. When economics asserted itself as a science in the nineteenth century, it relied on Bentham, rather than Smith, for its psychological assumptions. It that sense, the psychological underpinnings of orthodox economic theory were neo-Epicurean, and, beyond Bentham, they could be traced back to Helvétius. As Henry Sidg wick put it in 1877, "The premises of Bentham are all clearly given by Helvetius," whose psychological theory was very clear and simple:
Helvetius puts with a highly effective simplicity, from which Hume was precluded by his more subtle and complex psychological analysis, Force / First Principles in Translation 335 34. For instance, see Stigler 1971, 265 , which characterizes The Wealth of Nations as "a stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest." these two doctrines: fi rst, that every human being "en tout temps, en tout lieu" seeks his own interest, and judges of things and persons according as they promote it; and secondly, that, as the public is made up of individuals, the qualities that naturally and normally gain public esteem and are called virtues are those useful to the public. (638) Given the widespread acceptance of these psychological assumptions among economists, it is not surprising that The Wealth of Nations was read and interpreted from a neo-Epicurean or utilitarian point of view. This produced a number of puzzles, the most famous being the "Adam Smith problem," which was initially formulated by Lujo Brentano in 1877. Brentano perceived a contradiction between the explicit rejection of the selfi sh hypothesis in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and what he saw as an endorsement of the same hypothesis in The Wealth of Nations. He accounted for the discrepancy by supposing that, after writing The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith had discovered and adopted the views of Helvé tius on self-interest. According to Brentano (1891, 64) , The Wealth of Nations was based on the psychological theory of Helvétius:
In the "Investigations into the Wealth of Nations," on the contrary, he holds entirely to the views of the book of Helvetius upon the nature of man, and regards selfi shness as the only motive of human action. The consequences of this dogma of selfi shness permeate almost all parts of his work.
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The idea that Smith might have borrowed from the philosopher of selfinterest was discarded a long time ago (see Oncken 1897). Still, this reading of Smith is quite plausible if one uses the French translation (as many nineteenth-century economists did) instead of the original.
